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proposed repeal generated hysteria on university
campuses and in the press, but as was true with
many other provisions in the House bill (like the
proposed repeal of section 127, another educationrelated section3), the repeal of section 117(d) didn’t
4
happen. Nevertheless, on the theory that section
117(d) may come under attack again (and section
127, too), it’s important to understand what a
repeal would — and wouldn’t — have done.
In this report I explain why I think much of the
commentary on the proposed repeal was
5
overwrought and some of it was just wrong.
That’s not to say that section 117(d) deserved to
expire; it’s only to say that commentators,
including university administrators, should have
focused on what really would have happened in a
world without section 117(d).
Most of the news stories and pronouncements
of university administrators characterized the
proposed repeal as an attack on graduate
education in that it would have made taxable (or
so it was argued) tuition waivers provided to
graduate students who serve as teaching or
6
research assistants. (From now on I’m going to
use “TAs” as an umbrella term to refer to both

3

The House bill that led to the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-97)1 would have repealed
section 117(d) of the code, dealing with the tax
treatment of tuition waivers provided by
educational institutions to their employees and
2
some family members of the employees. The

See H.R. 1, section 1204(a)(2). Section 127 provides an exclusion of up
to $5,250 for amounts paid or incurred by an employer in providing
educational assistance to an employee if specified requirements are met.
(That $5,250 figure isn’t indexed for inflation and has been on the books
for years.)
4

The Senate bill contained no provision to repeal either section 117(d)
or section 127 (see S. Amdt. 1855, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017)), and
neither repeal survived conference committee deliberations.
5

Not all the commentary, of course. See, e.g., Patrick W. Thomas,
“GOP Raises Taxes on Graduate Students . . . Or Does It?” Surly
Subgroup Blog, Nov. 6, 2017.
6

1

Or whatever we’re supposed to call the legislation after the
reconciliation process. The official, ungainly title is “An Act to Provide
for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018,” P.L. 115-97, signed by the
president on December 22, 2017.
2

H.R. 1, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., section 1204(a)(3).

See, e.g., Eric Kelderman, “How the Republican Tax Plan Could Hurt
Graduate Students and American Research,” The Chronicle of Higher
Education, Nov. 17, 2017, at A19 (quoting several graduate students and
faculty as if a repeal of section 117(d) would have horrible effects on
graduate education and would affect no one else); and Kelderman, “How
the House GOP Tax Plan Would Affect Grad Students,” The Chronicle of
Higher Education, Dec. 1, 2017, at A22 (noting the effect of repeal on some
undergraduate tuition waivers — i.e., for those students who are resident
assistants — but focusing on graduate students).
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teaching and research assistants.) That’s very
misleading.
Section 117(d) makes it possible, in some
circumstances, for an employee of an educational
institution to exclude from gross income the
amount of a tuition reduction provided to the
employee, the employee’s spouse, or a dependent
child of the employee. In fact, the purportedly
“general” rule of section 117(d)(1) is that “gross
income shall not include any qualified tuition
reduction.” But not all tuition reductions are
qualified. For one thing, the exclusion can apply,
in general, only to tuition reductions for
7
education “below the graduate level.” By its
terms, section 117(d) at first glance therefore
seems to have no application at all to graduate
students. But section 117(d)(5) provides a special
rule for graduate students who are TAs and are
getting tuition waivers: “In the case of the
education of an individual who is a graduate
student at [a qualifying educational institution]
and who is engaged in teaching or research
activities for such organization, paragraph (2)
shall be applied as if it did not contain the phrase
‘(below the graduate level)’” (emphasis added).
If section 117(d) had been repealed, section
117(d)(5) would obviously have gone down with
the ship. For reasons I don’t understand, it was
doing away with that special treatment of TAs
that generated most of the controversy about
section 117(d)’s possible repeal. The idea that
repealing section 117(d) would have unfortunate
consequences for graduate education, and only
graduate education, both overstated the
significance of section 117(d)(5) and understated
the significance of section 117(d) as a whole,
which is in no way an expansive exclusion for
graduate-level tuition waivers.
I don’t blame the graduate students who
organized to fight the repeal of section 117(d),
successfully as it turned out (at least for now).
They were told that this proposed change
targeted them, and they had no reason to think
otherwise. (Few graduate students are tax
professionals or tax-professionals-to-be, after all,
and many of the educational institutions didn’t
help the grad students with statutory

7

Section 117(d)(2).

8

interpretation.) And under the circumstances,
the grad students had reason to be scared about
the possible economic effects of a repeal. TAs were
led to believe that if their tuition waiver is
nominally $50,000, say, they would be taxed on
$50,000 if section 117(d)(5) disappeared — a
frightening thought for those subsisting on ramen
noodles. (If the TAs are employees of the
university, as they presumably are, section 127
might have provided for a limited exclusion of up
to $5,250 per year for educational assistance,
assuming the requirements of that section are
9
satisfied. That would have helped the TAs a bit,
but no more than that. In any event, the House bill
would have repealed section 127 as well as section
10
117(d). )
The repeal of section 117(d) might not have
made any sense to begin with — I’m not sure
where the proposal came from11 — but I argue that
the reasons given in most of the commentary for
resisting repeal were often suspect. (We saw a lot
of — dare I say it? — fake news.) And the reasons
against repeal that should have been mustered
often weren’t. Most important, as I discuss in
Section I, is that doing away with section 117(d)
would have affected tuition waivers that have no
connection whatsoever to graduate education.
Section II analyzes the effects of a section 117(d)

8

The applicable standard should be, “When in doubt, look at the
statute.” And that’s a good idea even if you’re not in doubt.
9

See supra note 3. Among the requirements is that there be a
“separate written plan of an employer for the exclusive benefits of his
employees to provide such employees with educational assistance.”
Section 127(b)(1). If a university doesn’t have such a document, it could
easily create one. And the plan can’t discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees (section 127(b)(2)), but a plan directed at TAs
surely would satisfy the nondiscrimination requirement. Discussions
about section 127 generally assume that an educational assistance plan is
one in which an employer pays to send employees to educational
institutions, which of course is the case for most employers that aren’t
educational institutions themselves. But an “employer’s provision of
education to an employee” can be part of an educational assistance
program. See reg. section 1.127-2(c)(1)(ii); and infra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
10

See supra note 3.

11

It’s been suggested that the proposed repeal was part of a partisan
attack on higher education, and there may be something to that. But I
suspect most members of Congress were, like the graduate students,
clueless about all this. The House and Senate bills were massive
documents, and the repeals of sections 117(d) and 127 were hardly
focuses of the House bill.
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repeal on graduate students in five different
situations, concluding that the effects in many if
not most circumstances would have been — or
12
should have been, if I’m right — much more
limited than opponents of repeal claimed. Finally,
Section III considers what the measure of income
should be if a tuition reduction is taxable, and it
questions the common assumption that the stated
tuition figure — the sticker price — should be
given controlling weight in valuing an
educational benefit.
I. Effect of Repeal on Undergraduates
As I’ve noted, most of the controversy about
the repeal of section 117(d) focused on graduate
students, but eliminating section 117(d) would
have harmed undergraduate tuition waivers as
well (and, for that matter, tuition waivers
provided at private elementary and secondary
13
schools to dependents of faculty and staff ).
The universities that focused their resistance
to the repeal of section 117(d) on the assumed
effects on graduate students ignored a more
politically powerful argument: the detrimental
effects the change would have had on many staff
and on the educational institutions themselves if
undergraduate tuition waivers became taxable.
Folks like secretaries, cafeteria workers, and
janitors at a college or university who may have
taken their relatively low-paying jobs precisely
because of the tuition waiver program — making
it economically possible, they thought, to send
their kids to college14 — would have lost a major
nontaxable fringe benefit if section 117(d) had
15
been repealed. Indeed, the repeal might have
made college for many employees’ kids an

12

It happens occasionally.

13

To simplify the discussion, after this I’m going to ignore the effect
of a 117(d) repeal on employees of private elementary and secondary
schools, but it would have been real.
14

Even with section 117(d), the exclusion for qualified tuition
reductions doesn’t help all university employees with kids. For there to
be a benefit to a particular employee, the kids must be willing to go to
school at that university (or to another school for which the employer
school provides educational benefits). See infra note 16. Also, the kids
must meet the requirements for admission. If they can’t get in, there’s
obviously no tuition reduction. Finally, if the kids can get scholarships
from other universities, section 117(a) should make those scholarships
nontaxable, in which case the repeal of section 117(d) wouldn’t matter
nearly as much.
15

The college might continue to have a tuition waiver program, of
course, but the program’s tax-free status would have disappeared.

16

impossible dream. As an official of the American
Council on Education put it — an organization
that recognized that the effects of repealing
section 117(d) would have gone far beyond
graduate students — “The janitors are collateral
17
damage.”
If the university where you work has a stated
undergraduate tuition of $50,000 and that tuition
is waived when your child attends the university
(with no expectation that the kid perform services
for the school), under section 117(d)(1), that
benefit wouldn’t be taxed to you. Do away with
section 117(d), however, and you would suddenly
have a bump up in taxable income of as much as
$50,000 (if that’s the appropriate measure of
income18). (For reasons I discuss later, that benefit
almost certainly couldn’t be treated as a tax-free
scholarship, and, with a couple of very limited
exceptions, it’s hard to imagine any other
justification for excluding the value of the benefit
from the gross income of the university
employee.)
To a low-income college employee, that result
could be catastrophic. In those circumstances, as a
last resort it might make more economic sense to
send the kid to Big State University and pay full
tuition (or borrow to pay full tuition) rather than
have him or her attend the employee’s home
institution and receive a sizeable taxable tuition
benefit. (And maybe the kid can get a tuition
reduction at Big State — or some other institution
for which no one in the family works — that can
be treated as a good old-fashioned nontaxable

16

For purposes of this report, I’m generally ignoring tuition benefits
provided for employees to send their kids to other schools, but the
possibility of an excludable tuition waiver being partly or wholly taxfree exists in that situation as well. See section 117(d)(2) (exclusion can
apply to “any reduction in tuition provided to an employee of an
organization described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education
(below the graduate level) at such organization (or another organization
described in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)” of the employee or another person
described in section 132(h) (emphasis added)). The affected educational
institutions include any “organization which normally maintains a
regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a regularly enrolled
body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its
educational activities are regularly carried on.” Section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).
(Somebody should write an article on why Congress thought it
necessary to list “pupils” and “students” separately in that last passage.)
17

Quoted in Melissa Korn, “Universities, Companies Fight to Keep
Tax-Free Tuition Assistance,” The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 11, 2017. That
news story was one of the unusual ones in which it was noted that the
repeal of section 117(d) wouldn’t have affected only graduate TAs, and it
discussed the possible repeal of section 127, also included in the House
bill. See supra note 3.
18

Which it shouldn’t be. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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19

scholarship, a benefit that would be immune
from the effects of a repeal of section 117(d).)
If employees of educational institutions can
take advantage of undergraduate tuition waivers,
they benefit economically with section 117(d) in
the code, and so do the institutions. A tax-free
undergraduate tuition benefit makes it possible to
recruit at least some staff (and maybe faculty, too)
at lower salaries than would otherwise be
required. The additional undergraduate students
attributable to a nontaxable tuition waiver
program generally impose small costs on a school
(assuming the students’ beer consumption
20
doesn’t lead to destruction of school property),
even if those students generate little or no tuition
revenue.
And it’s not as though repealing section 117(d)
would have been a big revenue raiser for Treasury.
One of the effects of taxing undergraduate tuition
waivers would have been that university
employees wouldn’t have taken advantage of
those waivers nearly as much. Doing away with
section 117(d) would have generated some tax
revenue, to be sure, but it would have been a drop
in the federal bucket.
II. Effects on Graduate Students
So the repeal of section 117(d) would probably
have made undergraduate tuition waivers (those
that aren’t scholarships) taxable, and that would
have been a big deal by itself. But let’s get back to
the graduate student situation. Section 117(d)
generally doesn’t apply to tuition reductions at
the graduate level, but section 117(d)(5) does
provide for the possibility of a graduate-level
tuition waiver being tax-free, at least in part, for
TAs.
A. Graduate Tuition Reductions: Five Situations
What would be the tax treatment of graduatelevel tuition reductions if there were no section

19

See section 117(a); and infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.

117(d)? I examine five situations involving
graduate students who get tuition breaks. (You
almost certainly can come up with variations that
are worth discussion, but I think I’m covering the
most important possibilities.)
1. The graduate student has had no prior
employment relationship with the
university and will not work for the
university as a TA (or anything else)
during the time as a graduate student. Nor
does anyone else in the student’s family
have such an employment relationship
(that is, the student’s not getting a tuition
reduction because Mom, Dad, or a spouse
works for the university). The student
simply receives a tuition reduction for
graduate study.
2. The same as case 1, except that the tuition
reduction is conditioned on the student’s
serving as a TA.
3. The graduate student’s tuition is reduced
because Mom, Dad, or the student’s
spouse works for the university, and the
student isn’t a TA.
4. The graduate student’s tuition is reduced,
not because a family member works for
the educational institution, but because
and only because the student is a TA — an
employee of the university herself.
5. The graduate student’s tuition is reduced
because Mom, Dad, or the student’s
spouse works for the university, but the
student also serves as a TA. The tuition
reduction is conditioned on the student’s
being a TA.
I consider these possibilities one by one.
1. The plain old scholarship.
If a graduate student in a degree program is
paying less than the full sticker price (as is true for
almost all graduate students in the United States
who aren’t in professional programs and, for that
matter, for quite a few professional students as
21
well ), the student isn’t working for the university
as a TA or otherwise, and the student’s family

20

At least that’s true if the students are occupying seats in the
classroom that would otherwise have been unoccupied. Of course, even
if that’s so, an additional student isn’t completely cost-free. There are all
those individual meetings with students, exam grading, and paper
reading that faculty must do. On the other hand, the faculty aren’t likely
to be paid more because of those additional students, and the
administrative costs associated with a few additional students shouldn’t
be large.

21

That’s true for law students for sure and for many MBA students as
well. See Kelsey Gee, “Hey, Bargain-Hunters: An M.B.A. Is Cheaper Than
You Think,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 3, 2018 (noting that for the
Harvard Business School’s class of 2019, the average annual tuition paid
is $35,000, when the sticker price is $72,000).
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members are also not employed by the university,
there should generally be no gross income
22
associated with a tuition “reduction.”
That tuition reduction looks and quacks like a
scholarship, the tax treatment of which should be
governed by section 117(a). That section excludes
a qualified scholarship from gross income to the
extent it covers “qualified tuition and related
23
expenses.” (If that’s the case, any valuation issues
go away. Whatever the value of the nontaxable
benefit, it’s excludable from gross income.) To be a
qualified scholarship, the tuition reduction can’t
be compensation for a family member’s
24
performing services for the university, and the
student must be in a degree program.
Assuming those requirements are satisfied,
the scholarship is tax-free. And the basic
scholarship rules of section 117(a) don’t
distinguish between undergraduate and graduate
scholarships. In either case, they’re tax-free up to
the level of qualified tuition and related expenses.
The special rules in section 117(d) are
therefore irrelevant if the student is getting a
straightforward scholarship, and the repeal of
section 117(d) would have had no effect on
graduate students in those circumstances.
2. ‘Qualified scholarship’ but services
required.
Although section 117(a) generally excludes
from a student’s gross income any qualified
scholarship, up to the level of qualified tuition
and related expenses, the exclusion may not apply
in full if a student is performing services as a
condition of receiving the scholarship. As is true

with a qualified tuition reduction under section
117(d), to the extent the tuition reduction from the
scholarship is “payment for teaching, research, or
other services by the student required as a
condition for receiving the . . . qualified tuition
25
reduction,” the exclusion wouldn’t apply. As a
result, all or part of a tuition reduction called a
scholarship could be taxable compensation for
26
services. But the part of an otherwise legitimate
scholarship that doesn’t compensate for services
remains tax-free for graduate students and
undergraduate students.
The repeal of section 117(d) wouldn’t have
changed any of this.
3. Tuition reduction because of family
member’s employment, no TA arrangement.
Now, if the student gets the graduate tuition
reduction because Mom or Dad (or spouse) is an
employee of the university, the student almost
certainly wouldn’t be treated as receiving a
scholarship. A scholarship is in the nature of a
27
gift, with no expectation of benefit in return, and
in this scenario, the tuition benefit is part of the
compensation package for the employee (not the
student). There’s a quid for the quo. The exclusion
of section 117(d)(1) for a qualified tuition
reduction also couldn’t apply because the waiver
is at the graduate level and has nothing to do with
the student’s being a TA, thus making section
117(d)(5) irrelevant.
On these facts, once again the repeal of section
117(d) wouldn’t have mattered. The benefit would
almost certainly have been taxable regardless of
whether section 117(d) is in effect. It’s not the
graduate student who would be taxed on the

22

I put “reduction” in quotation marks just because it doesn’t seem to
be much of a reduction if most other graduate students at the institution
are paying little or nothing. I’ll come back to that point in discussing
what the amount of income to be taxed should be if the affected student
(or the associated family member) isn’t able to exclude the value of the
tuition benefit. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.

25

23

With exceptions, “subsections (a) [dealing with qualified
scholarships] and (d) [dealing with qualified tuition reductions] shall not
apply to that portion of any amount received which represents payment
for teaching or other services by the student required as a condition for
receiving the qualified scholarship or qualified tuition reduction.”
Section 117(c)(1). For these purposes, the term “payment” should be
interpreted expansively. All or part of a reduction in tuition could be
treated as a payment.

24

If a scholarship student performing services is treated as an
employee of the university, section 127 might exclude up to $5,250 of
otherwise taxable income, assuming the requirements of that section are
satisfied. See supra note 9.

Qualified tuition and related expenses generally includes tuition
and fees and the cost of “books, supplies, and equipment for courses of
instruction” at the educational institution. Section 117(b)(2). If the
financial aid covers more than qualified tuition and related expenses —
meals and lodging perhaps — the excess amount wouldn’t be tax-free
under section 117(a).
If the tuition reduction is compensation for a family member — i.e.,
a quid quo pro is involved — the tuition reduction is unlikely to be
treated as a scholarship. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. In that
case, we’d have to look at section 117(d). (Could a tuition reduction to
the dependent child of a university employee ever be a scholarship?
Maybe, if the student is selected to receive the scholarship by a
disinterested group that is unaware of the employment relationship with
the university. But that’s not the norm.)

26

27

See reg. section 1.117-4(c); see also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741
(1969). It’s been noted that proposed regulations issued in 1988 under
section 117 are a bit more generous in characterizing what can be a
qualified scholarship. Prop. reg. section 1.117-6. But I see no reason to
give authoritative weight to 20-year-old proposals that were never
finalized and that — as far as I know — no one is working on anymore.
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benefit, but the family member employed by the
university (unless you can come up with some
other theory for exclusion — a probably
28
impossible task).
4. Tuition reduction not caused by family
member’s employment but conditioned on
student’s being a TA.
Next, what if the graduate student receives a
tuition reduction not because of any family
member’s employment with the university, but
because the student is serving as a TA? In that
case, section 117(d)(5) might apply, making it
possible for the tuition reduction at the graduate
level to be treated as a qualified tuition reduction.
Or the tuition reduction might be considered a
qualified scholarship, despite the student’s also
having an employment relationship with the
university.29
But either way, the exclusion wouldn’t apply
to the extent the waiver is compensation for
services.30 This is an important point that was
overlooked in much of the discussion about the
possible repeal of section 117(d). It has never been
the case that the full amount of a qualified tuition
reduction is necessarily tax-free. To the extent the
student benefiting from the reduction is receiving
“payment for teaching, research, or other services
by the student required as a condition for
31
receiving the . . . qualified tuition reduction,” the
exclusion from gross income doesn’t apply. So,
regardless of the special treatment of TAs in
section 117(d)(5), the student might be taxed on
28

Section 127 doesn’t apply if someone other than the employee is the
beneficiary of the educational assistance program. The benefit isn’t a
working condition fringe as defined in section 132(d) to the employee
because if the employee paid for a child’s education, the expenditure
wouldn’t be deductible to the employee under section 162. And even
though that might seem like a no-additional-cost service as defined in
section 132(b) if the student isn’t bumping an otherwise full-paying
customer, there is reason to think that because of section 132(l), an
educational benefit can’t be treated as a tax-free no-additional-cost
service under section 132. Similarly, section 132(l) probably precludes
treating 20 percent of the value of the services as an excludable qualified
employee discount as defined in section 132(c). See infra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
29

Because of section 117(c)(1), both section 117(a) and (d) must be
premised on the assumption that at least part of a tuition reduction can
be tax-free even if the student is also performing services for the
institution — that is, even if the student may be treated as an employee
for some purposes. Reg. section 1.117-4(c) therefore shouldn’t require
treating the entire reduction as taxable just because of the employment
relationship. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30

Section 117(c)(1); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.

31

Section 117(c)(1). That same rule applies in determining the tax
effect of a qualified scholarship. Id.

the value of the benefits provided to compensate
the student for services, assuming no other
authority for excluding the benefit exists, and that
value could include all or part of the reduced
tuition.32
So, even with section 117(d) in force, an
exclusion of the full value of a tuition reduction
attributable to a graduate student’s being a TA
wouldn’t result from that section. And obviously
the possible partial exclusion attributable to the
interplay between section 117(d)(1) and section
117(d)(5) would be gone if 117(d) as a whole had
been repealed.
That might sound ominous, but it simply
means that, with or without section 117(d), we
should look for alternative theories for exclusion.
And the TA would be an employee, wouldn’t she?
If so, section 127 would likely apply (unless it was
repealed, as was also provided for in the House
bill), exempting up to $5,250 of income associated
with an educational assistance program provided
by employers to employees from an employee’s
gross income, assuming that the employer has a
33
qualifying program in place.
Even more important, however, the benefit
seems to be a working condition fringe, as defined
in section 132(d), excludable from an employee’s
income under section 132(a)(3). A working
condition fringe is generally a benefit provided by
an employer to an employee that if it had been
paid for by the employee would have been
deductible to that employee under either section
162, the ordinary and necessary business expense
provision, or section 167, dealing with allowances
for depreciation.
If the student is also an employee, as a TA
would be, and the student-employee paid tuition
for further training in the field in which she is a
TA, wouldn’t she satisfy the requirements of
section 162, as set out in reg. section 1.162-5? For
an employee to be able to treat educational
expenditures as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, the regulation generally requires that
the expenditures maintain or improve skills
32

But even so, the measure of any income should be the value of the
benefit, not the amount of the reduction below the sticker price for
tuition. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
33

See supra note 9. Repeal of section 127 was also part of the House
bill, see supra note 3, but that section, like section 117(d), survived the
legislative process.
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34

required in the employee’s employment, not be a
minimum educational requirement “for
35
qualification in his employment,” and not
36
qualify the person for a new trade or business.
Most TAs, at least those in nonprofessional
programs, should meet those requirements. If
you’re a TA in physics doing work toward a
master’s or a PhD in physics and you’re paying for
the education that will improve or maintain your
skills in physics, you’d be able to characterize the
tuition as an ordinary and necessary business
37
expense. You’re doing physics already, and
you’re studying for an advanced degree in
physics. That study will improve your skills as a
physicist, and it’s not necessary for a physicist to
have an advanced degree to be employed as a
physicist — that is, the degree wouldn’t be a
minimum educational requirement for the
business or qualify you for a new trade or
business. Yes, a PhD might open up some
academic (and other) positions that would
otherwise be closed to you, but there’s no
generally applicable requirement that one have a
PhD to do physics in an educational (or any other)
38
setting. What will you be doing if you later
become an assistant professor of physics
somewhere? Teaching and research, just what
you’re doing now, but with your skills enhanced

34

Reg. section 1.162-5(a)(1). The regulation provides an alternative
test: demonstrating that the education meets express requirements of the
employer, or of applicable law, to retain an already existing position. See
reg. section 1.162-5(a)(2).
35

Reg. section 1.162-5(b)(2)(i) and -5(a).

36

39

Until the TCJA, miscellaneous itemized deductions were
deductible only to the extent that, in the aggregate, they exceeded 2
percent of adjusted gross income (section 67, before amendment by the
TCJA), and then only to the extent that the potentially deductible portion
of the miscellaneous itemized deductions together with other itemized
deductions exceeded the standard deduction for the taxpayer.
40

Reg. section 1.162-5(b)(3) and -5(a).

37

One might reasonably question whether all educational
expenditures that meet the requirements of reg. section 1.162-5 are really
expenses rather than capital expenditures. Many educational
expenditures have significant future benefits (or so one hopes). And
capital expenditures are generally not deductible, unless Congress
provides specific authority to make them deductible. If we were starting
from scratch in thinking about the deductibility of education
expenditures, the expense-versus-capital-expenditure issue might be a
reasonable one to raise. But it has long been taken for granted that
expenditures that meet the stated requirements of the regulation are
ordinary and necessary business expenses. For example, the costs of
getting an LLM in taxation are generally deductible for someone who is
already a tax lawyer, even though the expenditure will have effects on
the rest of that lawyer’s professional career.
38

by the graduate education received while an
employee of the university.
Now it may be that because of other
limitations on deductibility, the student-employee
would in fact be unable to deduct the full sticker
price for tuition if she had actually paid it herself.
Employee business expenses are itemized
deductions. Moreover, they’re miscellaneous
itemized deductions — that is, they’re
expenditures that meet the requirements of
section 162 for potential deductibility but that
have long been subject to stringent limitations on
deductibility.39 And as a result of the TCJA, for tax
years from 2018 through 2025, miscellaneous
itemized deductions aren’t deductible at all under
the regular income tax40 (as has been the case
41
under the alternative minimum tax anyway ). But
limitations of that sort aren’t considered in
determining whether a benefit is a working
42
condition fringe. The only question is whether
the threshold requirements for deductibility
under section 162 (or section 167) would be
satisfied if the employee had made the
43
expenditure herself. If so, the benefit provided
by the employer to the employee seems to be a
working condition fringe.
Although I’d like to, I can’t ignore the cryptic
section 132(l), which could throw a monkey

It might be necessary to have a PhD to get a faculty position as a
physicist at many universities, but it’s not a requirement at all academic
institutions. And it’s certainly not a requirement for positions in physics
more generally. In contrast, a law degree does qualify a person for a new
trade or business, or so the regulation suggests. See reg. section 1.1625(b)(3)(ii), Example 2. As a result, the cost of a JD program isn’t
deductible, even if the reason for getting the degree is to improve skills
in a non-lawyer position — being a law librarian, for example.

41

See TCJA section 11045 (adding subsection (f) to section 67).
See section 56(b)(1)(A)(i).

42

See reg. section 1.132-5(a)(1)(vi) (noting that “the limitation of
section 67(a) (relating to the two-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized
deductions) is not considered when determining the amount of a
working condition fringe”); and supra note 39.
43

That’s how the working condition fringe rules had been understood
under prior law, under which miscellaneous itemized deductions,
including employee business expenses, were deductible only to the
extent of amounts exceeding 2 percent of AGI. If that’s not the way the
provision is interpreted now, the working condition fringe category
would largely be gone, except for benefits that if paid for by the
employee would have been deductible to the employee under section
167, the depreciation provision. The reference in section 132(d) to section
162 (“if the employee paid for such . . . services, such payment would be
allowable as a deduction under section 162”) would be surplusage, at
least if the regulations are correct in providing that the language doesn’t
apply to a hypothetical payment that “would be allowable as a
deduction with respect to a trade or business of an employee other than
the employee’s trade or business of being an employee of the employer.”
Reg. section 1.132-5(a)(2)(i). As we all know, Congress never includes
surplus language in legislation.
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wrench into the above analysis. Except for de
minimis fringes — a category that should be
irrelevant for tuition reductions anyway —
section 132(l) provides that section 132 “shall not
apply to any fringe benefits of a type the tax
treatment of which is expressly provided for in
any other section of this chapter.” (Perhaps
Congress could have come up with fuzzier
language, but doing that would have required
effort.) Educational benefits of the tuition
reduction sort are expressly provided for in other
provisions, including sections 117 and 127, and
section 132(l) might mean that a tuition reduction
provided by an educational institution to an
employee — a fringe benefit to the employee —
can’t be a working condition fringe.
My understanding is that one intention of
section 132(l) was to prevent a tuition reduction
provided to a university employee (or spouse or
dependent child of an employee) from being
treated as a no-additional-cost service (as defined
in section 132(b)), excludable from the employee’s
gross income under section 132(a)(1). If a
university has empty seats in the program in
which an employee is taking classes, the benefit
might seem to be an excess-capacity service, like
an airline employee’s occupying an otherwise
empty seat on a flight or a hotel chain employee’s
occupying an otherwise empty hotel room — the
44
quintessential no-additional-cost service. But if
section 132(l) controls — and it probably does
under current law45 — an employee occupying
otherwise empty seats in a university’s
classrooms, and therefore perhaps imposing no
substantial additional costs on the university,
can’t exclude the benefit from gross income for
that reason. (In many cases, however, particularly

44

Those are two of the three examples of excess-capacity services
given in reg. section 1.132-2(a)(2). The third is telephone services.
Forgone revenue can be an additional cost for these purposes (see
section 132(b)(2)), but if the employee is occupying what would
otherwise have been an empty seat or hotel room, there’s no forgone
revenue.
45

None of the examples in the relevant regulation involves anything
like educational benefits. See supra note 44.

with graduate students, the costs to the university
attributable to additional students receiving
tuition reductions may be substantial, in which
case the possibility of a no-additional-cost service
would disappear anyway.)46
Similarly, because of section 132(l), a tuition
reduction isn’t supposed to be treated as a
qualified employee discount for services,
therefore excludable from gross income under
section 132(a)(2) to the extent the discount doesn’t
exceed “20 percent of the price at which the
services are being offered by the employer to
customers.”47
Commentators have maintained that section
132(l) might also preclude treating a tuition
reduction as a working condition fringe, and there
is some evidence in unpublished IRS rulings and
advice (now dated, often unclear, and sometimes
pointing in different directions) to support that
48
position. But because of the requirement that
there be a sufficient connection between the
nature of the benefit and the employee’s trade or
business as an employee — the requirement that
either section 162 or section 167 would have
applied if the employee had paid for the fringe
benefit — the working condition fringe seems to
be qualitatively different from qualified employee
discounts and no-additional-cost services. It’s

46

At least in some fields, graduate students cost the institution a lot
— laboratory expenses, for example. And even in less capital-intensive
fields, having an additional graduate student paying little or no tuition
makes economic demands on the institution, particularly because of the
generally close relationship between grad students and faculty mentors.
It’s not the same as having an additional undergraduate sitting in a
lecture hall with 300 other students.
47

Section 132(c)(1)(B).

48

See, e.g., LTR 9040045 (paraphrasing, but not precisely quoting, reg.
section 1.132-1(f)(1) to the effect that “because section 117(d) provides
for the tax treatment of tuition reductions, the exclusions under section
132 generally do not apply to free or discounted tuition waivers provided
by an educational institution to its employees, whether the tuition is for
study at or below the graduate level” (emphasis added)). In that private
letter ruling, the word “generally” was added to the regulatory
language, and the ruling noted the possibility of graduate tuition
benefits being treated as a working condition fringe so long as the tuition
benefits “relate to the employee’s trade or business as an employee of the
employer providing the benefits.” Twelve years later, in FSA 200231016,
the IRS advised that a “tuition reduction provided by a university may
not be excluded from an employee’s gross income as a working
condition fringe benefit,” and it suggested that working condition fringe
treatment is available only if the employer “pays” something, which is
not the case with a qualified tuition reduction. Further, the 2002 field
service advice suggested that the 1990 letter ruling was intended to
conclude that working condition fringe treatment might be available
only to the extent that (1) the employer pays something to another
organization for an employee’s education and (2) either section 127
wouldn’t apply at all, or the expenses exceed the $5,250 annual
exclusion.
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hard to see why a tuition reduction that meets the
definition of working condition fringe should
automatically fail to qualify for the exclusion.
In any event, some educational benefits
provided by employers to employees may well be
working condition fringes. In 1989 Congress
specifically provided, in what is now section
132(j)(8), that “amounts paid or expenses incurred
by the employer for education or training
provided to the employee which are not
excludable from gross income under section 127
shall be excluded from gross income under this
section if (and only if) such amounts or expenses
49
are a working condition fringe.” At a minimum,
that provision seems to approve the possibility of
working condition fringe treatment in connection
with “amounts paid or expenses incurred” by the
employer under section 127 programs that exceed
the $5,250 cap. Not all, or even most, benefits
provided in a section 127 program will be
working condition fringes, because there’s no
requirement under that section that the education
be in the same trade or business that the employee
is currently working in. But if, for a particular
employee, the educational assistance is
sufficiently connected to the employee’s existing
trade or business and the other requirements of
reg. section 1.162-5 are satisfied, the benefit is a
working condition fringe.
In its guidance to employers on the tax
treatment of fringe benefits, the IRS assumes that
an educational benefit can be a working condition
fringe even if section 127 would apply in part. The
agency has accepted the proposition that an
educational benefit that is not excludable under
section 127, or that exceeds the dollar limitation in
that section, may still be a working condition
50
fringe. Indeed, the IRS states straightforwardly
that “property or a service provided is a working
condition benefit to the extent that if the employee
paid for it, the amount paid would have been

49

Section 132(j)(8).

50

IRS Publication 15-B, “Employer’s Tax Guide to Fringe Benefits,” at
22 (2017) (providing that “certain job-related education you provide to
an employee may qualify as a working condition benefit,” as long as the
expenditures would meet the requirements for deductibility under reg.
section 1.162-5 if the employee had paid the expenses him or herself);
and id. at 9 (educational assistance to employees under a qualifying
educational assistance program may be excluded under section 127 up
to $5,250; excess amounts must be treated as wages, “unless the benefits
are working condition benefits”).

deductible as a business or depreciation
expense.”51 (Yes, services provided can be a
working condition fringe even if the employer
incurs few, if any, out-of-pocket costs.) Another
quote: “Examples of working condition benefits
include an employee’s use of a company car for
business, an employer-provided cell phone
provided primarily for compensatory business
purposes, and job-related education provided to
52
an employee.” The critical question is, as always,
whether the employee would have been able to
deduct the cost under section 162 if he had paid it
himself.
No, an IRS publication isn’t a definitive
statement of the law, but neither are private letter
rulings and similar authority from years ago. And
I know that at least some universities take the
position that the value of graduate-level tuition
reductions should not be taxable to employees if
the requirements for a working condition fringe
are satisfied — an example being a tuition waiver
provided to someone to earn an MBA at the
university’s business school, if the person already
holds a high administrative position at the
53
university. If that understanding is wrong, a lot
of educational institutions have been violating the
54
law.
It’s been suggested that working condition
fringe treatment should be available for a tuition
reduction only if the university has established an
educational assistance program under section 127
and the program applies only to the extent of
“amounts paid or expenses incurred” for an
employee’s educational assistance.55 (The same
56
phrase is used in section 132(j)(8). ) And if the
university itself is providing the education, the

51
52

Id. at 10.
Id. at 21.

53

For example, the question generally asked with tuition waivers for
employees to attend MBA programs of the university is whether the
employee is already in a relatively high administrative position. If yes,
the benefit is a working condition fringe. (MBAs don’t generally qualify
a person for a new trade or business in that it’s unnecessary to have an
MBA to be an administrator.) In contrast, for a secretary, say, the
connection between the MBA and the skills required in the secretary’s
current trade or business is tenuous.
54

Even though the tax liability would ultimately be the employee’s,
the university has reporting and withholding obligations that would not
have been met if a university has been wrong on this issue.
55
56

Section 127(a)(1).
See supra text accompanying note 48.
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university will pay little and incur few expenses
in educating its own employees.
Should it matter that with a tuition reduction,
the university doesn’t seem to have any amounts
paid or expenses incurred? It can’t be the case, can
it, that expenditures made by a university for an
employee’s graduate-level education at another
institution can be excluded from the employee’s
income under section 127 (up to the cap, of
course) and, beyond the cap, perhaps further
excluded if the benefit is a working condition
57
fringe (as suggested by section 132(j)(8)), but that
an employee who receives graduate-level
education at a bargain price at his own university
wouldn’t get the limited protection of section 127
and might not even have the rest of the benefit
characterized as a working condition fringe?
What sense would that make? Yes, Congress can
enact nonsensical statutes, but we should try to
interpret congressional enactments in a sensible
way, unless it’s just impossible to do so.
In this situation, I have no difficulty
interpreting section 127 to cover educational
assistance provided to a university employee at
the university itself as eligible for the exclusion
(assuming the other statutory requirements have
been satisfied) and eligible for working condition
fringe treatment as well if the connection between
the education and the employee’s existing trade or
58
business is sufficient. If that’s so, once again,
section 117(d) seems to be irrelevant — or at least
largely so — for TAs. The repeal of that section
should change none of this.
And maybe I’m making this harder than it
should be. Remember that, if enacted in its
original form, the House bill would have repealed
both section 117(d) and section 127. If that had
happened, section 132(l) (“This section [132] shall
not apply to any fringe benefits of a type the tax
treatment of which is expressly provided for in
any other section of this chapter”) would no
longer be problematic, or so it seems. The
argument that a tuition reduction can’t be a
working condition fringe because of section 132(l)

depended on the existence of other provisions in
the code that deal specifically with tuition
reductions as compensation. Do away with both
sections 117(d) and 127, however, and the
problem goes away with them. As a result, a
tuition reduction provided by an employer to an
employee might be a working condition fringe,
regardless of any prior understanding to the
contrary. For that matter, if both sections 117(d)
and 127 had been repealed, the tuition reduction
might also be a no-additional-cost service
59
(although that isn’t clear for graduate students ),
and it might be nontaxable, in part, as a qualified
employee discount.60
In short, if the repeal of section 117(d) would
have had any effect in this situation, it would have
been only to clarify that the tuition benefit might
be treated as a fringe benefit potentially
excludable from an employee’s gross income
under at least one of the subsections of section
132.
5. Tuition reduction from family member’s
employment but also conditioned on
student’s being a TA.
Finally, let’s suppose the tuition reduction is
attributable to the grad student’s having a parent
or spouse employed by the university, but the
student is also obligated to serve as a TA. (Maybe
all grad students in a particular department are
obligated to do TA service.) This situation
presumably can’t be a qualified scholarship, even
in part, because the tuition waiver is part of the
compensation package for the family member.61
Under section 117(d), the graduate-level tuition
waiver isn’t tax-free, even in part, unless section
117(d)(5) would kick in. And it ought to, except
for any part of the tuition reduction that is
62
compensation for the student’s services. But take
away section 117(d), and the full value of the
benefit would be taxable to the family member
unless some other theory for exclusion can be
found.

59

See id.

58

See supra note 46.

60

57

Cf. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1974)
(concluding that the phrase “paid out” in section 263(a) can
encompasses the depreciation allowance available for an asset in the
current year, even though nothing is actually paid in that year).

I know, I know. This particular argument doesn’t work as well if
Congress had repealed only section 117(d) or only section 127. But I can’t
work through all the combinations and permutations here.
61
62

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Section 117(c)(1); see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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In this case, section 117(d) may matter a lot. It
may be only because of the special treatment for
TAs in section 117(d)(5) that this benefit at the
graduate level is potentially tax-free, at least in
part. Even so, however, remember that the
exclusion for qualified tuition waivers doesn’t
apply to the extent the TA is being compensated
for services that were part of the tuition reduction
63
package.
There doesn’t seem to be a possibility of
treating this tuition reduction as a working
condition fringe. The TA’s tuition waiver is
attributable to the family member’s being an
employee of the university. It’s that person who
will be taxed on the benefit if no exclusion from
gross income applies, and the family member’s
not going to be able to argue plausibly that if he
had paid Sonny’s tuition, the expenditure would
be an ordinary and necessary business expense of
the family member.
Yes, Sonny is treated as an employee for
purposes of the tuition waiver rules of section
117(d). That section says to treat as an employee
for purposes of section 117(d) “any person treated
as an employee (or whose use is treated as an
64
employee use) under the rules of section 132(h).”
And those rules treat spouses and dependent
children as employees, but only for purposes of
the no-additional-cost service and qualified
employee discount provisions of section 132, not
for the working condition fringe rules.65
But as was true with case 4, if both section
117(d) and section 127 had been repealed, perhaps
that would have opened up the possibility of the
benefit being tax-free, at least in part, as a noadditional-cost service (assuming the education
66
provided is in fact an excess-capacity service ) or
as a qualified employee discount, if the relevant
requirements of section 132 are satisfied.
B. The Bottom Line in the Five Hypotheticals
In three of the cases considered, most
graduate-level tuition reductions should not be

taxable under one theory or another, whether or
not section 117(d) is in place. For case 3, the
benefit would probably be taxable (but to the
family member, not the student) regardless of
whether section 117(d) is around. A few graduate
students — those whose tuition reductions are
attributable to a family member being an
employee of the university and who are TAs as a
condition of the tuition reduction — had
legitimate reasons to be concerned about the
repeal of section 117(d). That’s case 5, although
even there a possibility exists for exclusion under
67
an alternative theory.
For most graduate students, therefore, the
repeal should have made no difference. And
when a tuition reduction, whether at the graduate
or undergraduate level, is taxable to someone in
whole or in part, the consequences shouldn’t be
nearly as horrific as many contended in the
discussions about the effects of section 117(d)
repeal. That’s the subject of Section III.
III. The Measure of Income
Suppose a particular tuition reduction is
taxable, in whole or in part, to someone. How
much taxable income is there? The assumption in
much of the commentary about section 117(d)’s
possible repeal assumed that the dollar amount of
any tuition reduction — the reduction in the
sticker price — would be the measure of income.
That’s why many graduate TAs went ballistic.
They assumed that if they were receiving a 100
percent tuition waiver, and if the sticker price for
tuition was $50,000, they would have income of
$50,000 on which they would have to pay taxes.
Or, if the person taxed on a full tuition waiver is
the student’s mom, Mom would have a $50,000
bump of gross income.
That makes no sense to me. The measure of
income associated with any benefit should be the
fair market value of the benefit, not the sticker
price. If a used car dealer transfers a car, at no cost,
to an employee — pretty clearly there’s
68
compensation for services in that case — the
measure of income should be the value of the car,

63

Id.

64

Section 117(d)(2)(B).

67

65

Section 132(h)(2) and 132(h) (“For purposes of paragraphs (1) and
(2) of subsection (a).”).
66

But see supra note 46 and accompanying text.

See id.

68

Because of section 102(c), a transfer from an employer to an
employee can’t be treated as a nontaxable gift, no matter how benevolent
the employer’s purposes for the transfer were.
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not the figure marked on the windshield. The
value isn’t $5,000 just because that’s the amount
the dealer would like to be able to sell the clunker
for. We all know that the $5,000 is, for most car
dealers, a starting point for negotiation, not a hard
and fast price.
And that’s just as true these days for stated
tuition figures at most colleges and universities in
this country. Of course, every institution would
like to be able to get $50,000 (or more) per year
from each student, but the actual amount paid
will on average be far less than that. College
administrators talk about the “discount rate” for
their tuition — a discount rate of 50 percent means
that the college receives half the revenue it would
have had if all students had paid the full sticker
price. But most colleges couldn’t come close to
filling their entering classes with students paying
the stated price — at least not students who can
read and write. That’s always been true, but it’s
particularly true now since, in the last few
decades, stated tuition figures have gone up much
faster than inflation.
All of that is to say that sticker prices are
suspect measures of value.69 The used car dealer
who sells the car marked $5,000 for $1,500 may
say he has a discount rate of 70 percent, but in fact
he got full value for the car. If the average student
at University A is paying only $20,000 to $25,000,
and maybe even less, when the tuition is

supposedly $50,000, isn’t that average price a
better measure of FMV than the sticker price?70
To illustrate the absurdity of using sticker
price as a measure of income, consider the
following: Suppose Big College doubles its stated
tuition figure from $50,000 to $100,000, and
nothing else changes. Every student pays exactly
the same amount after the “hike” in tuition as
before. Surely no one would think that each
student is getting an additional benefit of $50,000
and that, if the benefit were taxable to the student
or his parents, someone should have $50,000 more
in gross income. Big College might — indeed, it
probably would — trumpet the increase in its
financial aid budget (“We guarantee every
student a scholarship of at least $50,000!”), but
nothing of substance has happened.
If a typical graduate student at a university is
paying little or no tuition — and that’s the case for
graduate students in the arts, humanities, and
71
social sciences — why in the world would the
value of a tuition reduction be treated as $50,000
(or whatever figure constitutes the sticker price)?
The right number may not be zero — and there is,
of course, no clearly “right” figure here — but it’s
hard to see how $50,000 is even arguably right.
Of course, a few people might be paying the
full sticker price (foreign students being
supported by their governments, for example),
70

69

Why, you might ask, would a university with a rational
administration (they do exist) have an unrealistically high sticker price,
when a preposterously high figure will inevitably scare away a few highquality applicants? Several reasons are generally given: Many foreign
students do in fact pay (or their governments pay) the full sticker price,
so it’s necessary for a college to pretend that its real price is that higher
figure. (Foreign governments are catching on, however.) There is also
apparently some prestige value associated with having a high sticker
price. (“We’re as good as Harvard, and of course we charge as much as
Harvard does.”) Also, with higher and higher tuition figures, university
administrators can, with a straight face, ask alums for “student support,”
to cover the “cost” of those scholarships.
And students don’t necessarily suffer from the bloated sticker prices.
Kids who get a scholarship for $30,000, say — even if almost everyone in
the student body gets a “scholarship” at that or a higher level — can put
something like “Recipient, C. Hubert Throckmorton Scholarship, 20162017” on their curricula vitae. The students can also tell Mom and Dad,
“Look, I got this extraordinary scholarship. Aren’t you proud of me? Oh,
and given what I’ve saved you, what about that new car?”

I once mentioned to the CFO of a university that I saw no reason
why the value of a taxable tuition benefit should be measured by sticker
price, and his response was that that was the only way he could
administer a program that provides some taxable educational benefits
(e.g., tuition waivers for nonadministrative employees in the university’s
MBA program, when the tuition reduction exceeds the $5,250 figure
excludable under section 127). I’m not convinced. In many situations
there’s no way to come up with an income figure that is unquestionably
right — if, for example, a company official flies on a company jet for
personal purposes. Rules must be developed to deal with these
situations, and they have been. Yes, the rules are necessarily somewhat
arbitrary, but they make the unadministrable administrable. If an
undergraduate tuition waiver were taxable, I’d say the average price
paid by an undergraduate student at the particular university would be
a reasonable estimate of the value provided. Every college in the country
could easily come up with that information. The same method of
estimating FMV could be applied to graduate-level tuition reductions as
well.
71

Charge graduate students in the English department $50,000 in
annual tuition, and the institution will have no graduate program in
English. If a school is going to have graduate programs in subjects for
which potential earning power is limited, the institution can’t be
expected to charge much in the way of tuition, whatever the official
tuition price is. And there are prestige reasons — membership in the
Association of American Universities, for example — for a university to
have a significant number of PhD programs and to generate lots of PhDs.
See Association of American Universities, “Membership Policy.” Even
prestigious business schools are cutting the “real” tuition for MBA
programs. See Gee, supra note 21.
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just as a few buyers of used cars may pay the
dealer’s initial asking price. But that shouldn’t
mean that the sticker price is automatically the
value of the service or property for federal tax
purposes.
IV. Conclusion
The taxability (or nontaxability) of tuition
benefits is much more complicated than it should
be, and I’m sure you can come up with more
hypothetical situations worth discussion. But my
conclusion from all of this is that the outrage
about the effect of a section 117(d) repeal on
graduate students was overdone.
That’s not to say that a repeal of section 117(d)
would have been meaningless. It would have
affected some graduate students, but even more
important, it would have had a devastating
impact on the undergraduate tuition waiver
programs at many colleges and on similar
programs at private elementary and secondary
schools. That would have mattered a lot, and it’s
too bad that the discussion of the repeal of section
117(d) didn’t focus on those effects.
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